In the early literature on missile guidance I came across a photograph, taken by an unknown pilot on an unknown day in 1944, holding two blurred figures still within its frame, frozen in time somewhere in the skies above London (fig. 1 ). Winged objects both, though of slightly differing configurations, the two appeared locked in a mid-flight mechanical embrace. I later learned that the photograph reveals the first meeting between British pilots and an entirely new weapon employed by the Germans, the V-1 guided rocket, an early predecessor of the famed V-2.
Such as that Elegant Blend of Philosophy and Hardware Preface to a History of Geographical Autonomy In the early literature on missile guidance I came across a photograph, taken by an unknown pilot on an unknown day in 1944, holding two blurred figures still within its frame, frozen in time somewhere in the skies above London (fig. 1 ). Winged objects both, though of slightly differing configurations, the two appeared locked in a mid-flight mechanical embrace. I later learned that the photograph reveals the first meeting between British pilots and an entirely new weapon employed by the Germans, the V-1 guided rocket, an early predecessor of the famed V-2.
Apparently the nascent missile traveled at speeds lesser than aircraft of the period, a fact not lost on the British airmen who quickly realized that although it could not be frightened off its vicious course, the rocket could nonetheless be downed by a delicate wing nudge from a defending airplane. Thus the ridiculous scene in the photo, the serenity of the image distending the violence of its content, a tango of humanity anci hardware. Squadron leader Joseph Barry is known to have ruined the most V-ls, somehow amassing the curious total of 66 and l/3rd before himself succumbing to airborne flak in late 1944 ( fig. 2 ).' Slumped now in the privacy of my thought, 1 was left to consider the quality of frightening that surely fixed on these pilots, brushing up so gingerly alongside mechanized autonomy, as they struggled to tip the And for that matter, what was the missile thinking? Or rather, how was the missile thinking? Or, still more precisely, how does one think alongside a missile? There is a prevailing debate that wants to resolve whether or not an object can "think"; let's agree that I'd like to avoid that contest for the remainder of this essay.Î nstead, following Wittgenstein, the first step is to look at the phrase "to think" as a tool.' In this manner, 1 am here considering the employment of a tool (thinkingas-tool) by an object (a missile)permission for which even the most dire humanist or severe automatist would grant me. Further suggestions, this time from the Tractatus: objects are simple; objects contain the possibility of all situations; and the possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object.Ŵ ith these thoughts in mind, I inquired after the character of the guided missile.
I. Missile Basics
Initial research revealed essentially four different classes of missile guidance platforms. Pre-set guidance in which a pre-calculated program is fed into a device before firing and cannot thereafter be altered.
Command guidance, which is the directing of the missile by means of control signals which originate from outside the missile, usually from or near the where some property of the target itself can be sensed by the missile, which then automatically steers itself to the target.B oth command and direction along a path might be called "basic" guidance systems, defined as those missiles which require control by a human operator at any point after launch ( fig. 3 ). By contrast, both preset and homing can be seen as "autonomous" guidance systems. Autonomous guidance systems are fully independent of human operators from the moment of launch until final strike ( fig. 4 ). Basic (nonautonomous) guidance systems can be identified as those in which the vehicle control aspects are located outside the body of the missile. But in any autonomous system the mechanisms for both control and guidance are located on-board the missile, entirely contained within its frame. In military terms, these autonomous systems are often referred to as "fire-and-forget" systems, and must possess the ability to relate target and weapon motion with respect to a common reference.* made its attendance known, were it not for a deafening explosion moments later, Simpson would surely have questioned his eyes having actually seen it/ One highly evolved method of autonomous guidance is terrestrial-reference guidance, of which terrainsensing is the most complex form. Terrestrial reference guidance systems are those in which a precietermined path, set into the control system of a missile, can be followed by a device in the missile that reacts to some property of the earth. As these systems developed, they came to rely on more and more sophisticated mechanisms for "viewing" the earth, from photooptical recognition, to remote sensing and GPS.
The first terrestrial reference system to move beyond simple gravitational attunement was the Automatic Terrain Recognition and Nai'igatioti (ATRAN) system, developed in the early 1950s.* Through a mapmatching correlation process, ATRAN continuously tracked the ever-changing pattern of terrain features by comparing the observed radar returns to a sequence of reference images stored in its memory. ATRAN used a conventional, X-band, short-pulsed, non-coherent scanning radar sensor to map the ground area in the forward 135 degree sector of the missile ( fig. 7 ). Video information provided by this active scanning radar sensor was automatically compared on a real time point-to-point basis with similar synchronized video, generated in a flying-spot-scannera device whose operability stunned me when first I stumbled on its existence. Contour models of the entire flight path were handmade, and then filmed by a camera, simulating the eventual position of the missile as it traveled. The reference images were stored on a 35mm film strip; a new reference frame was used with each two nautical miles of travel ( fig. 8 ).
The missile map-matching problem consists of locating the position of a sensor relative to a reference map which is stored onboard the vehicle's computer ( fig. 9 ).
Once the match location is found, the relative location between the two map centers can be used to update the vehicle's navigafional position. The important performance considerations are the avoidance of false fixes as measured by their frequency of occurrence, and the accuracy with which the posifion fix can be made." I discovered that the investigation of radar mapmatching was inidated by the Goodyear Aerospace Its significance lies in the fact tiiat tiie method of automation was inherently geographical, and constituted fundamentally new relations between technology, the earth, and both human and machinic judgment.
The limitations of the ATRAN system became immediately apparent to its makers. Even a slight discrepancy between the sensed image and the stored image would be enough to send the object off its course. ATRAN was easily influenced by seasonal, or even diurnal variations in radiated light, and highly susceptible to inaccuracies or failures resulting from inclement weather, which limited its ability to view the ground. Additionally, the system itself was limited by the coarseness of the resolution made available by the flying-spot-scanner image. For systems designers of the period, improved accuracy and performance centered on what came to be known as "scenediscrimination" (fig. 10 ).
The scene was the most complex component of the map-matching problem, and the most difficult to model. Scenes can be described in the visual domain as being composed of a set of features. Actual sensor data, broken down by resolution elements, are described by a set of intensity values. There are regions of intensity values in the scene that can be considered analogous to features in the visual domain. From a physical standpoint, homogeneous regions are areas in which the signature is expected to remain fairly constant, e.g. a grassy field in which all the elements in the region are expected to have the same mean value but not necessarily a constant value ( fig. 11 ). Map-matching was the lynchpin of geographic automationa central innovation in the great mechanization of vision that began with the camera and continues today.
III. Statistical Morality
The guided missile is to space what the clock was to time; an expedition into accuracy and precision by a human desire committed to knowing, not when, but where it is, constantly. Mounted on stability platforms, balanced by counter-gyros, manufacturing false horizons, we taught this objectthis thingto know, or rather how to know, continuously, precisely where it is in space, no matter its speeda skill that not a single one of us possesses ( fig. 12 ).
Like the clock, the missile is a reflection of the specific interpretation of the physical world on which its design is based. But unlike time, which could be measured mechanically, the space of the guided missile is measured statistically. Clock time, like clock motion, was, and is, ideally reversible, equally perfect forward and backwards. But thermodynamics laid bare the obvious irreversibility of both, forcing the substitution of asymmetrical explanation for mechanistic determinism. Its subsequent reduction to statistical mechanics has left us with troubling questions regarding the status of causality.'" Disturbed and mesmerized by images wound and rewound, the missile is at once so familiar and so foreign to my sensibilities. Its agility, dexterity, its truculent resolve, its temperament, its capacity for judgment; all can be traced to the circumstances of its birth, to its existence as a child of our own statistical morality; which is to say, to our collective belief that the certainty stolen from us by Carnot and Maxwell can be restored by the theories of Gibbs and Boltzman." Statistical morality is the collective belief that although the causal chain of the physical world is no longer defined by perfect, irreversible regularity, it is nonetheless subject to statistical regularities, as expressed by probabilities. Knowingly or not, we all participate in this morality, we all believe. If the guided missile has kin, they're not mechanical devices, but actuaries, weathermen, and stock analysts. It may be difficult for us to understand Wittgenstein's assertion that an object contains the possibility of all situattons, but the missile understands this intuitively. It's from among these possible situations that it makes judgments regarding the probability of success, so that it's able to constantly increase this probability through calculated movement. The missile is explicitly designed to contain all possible scenarios, to recognize the most desirable from among the many. Accordingly we occasionally encounter an odd state of affairs wherein the missile's unbending pursuit of the selected target, its obdurate drive to continually increase the probability of success, outpaces the material and structural capabilities of its lightweight airframe; leading, remarkably, to a kind of cybernetic suicide in which the servos calculate a path of exponentially increasing lateral acceleration that inevitably rips the object apart from the inside out ( fig. 13 ).'Î V. Military Geography and Sensed-Terrain What is omitted when a missile travels to its target? What strange perversion of classical military strategy was effected when the conventional mechanization of warfare was so thoroughly and instantly eclipsed, substituting inertial guidance for the long history of Quite apart from their influence on sources of supply... geography and the character of the ground bear a close and ever-present relation to warfare. They have a decisive influence on engagement, both as to its course and to its planning and exploitation.'Ê quating geography with ground features, Clausewitz sought to elucidate its influence by exploring the "fullest sense of the meaning" of the French term terrain. He hypothesized that geography can affect the course of warfare in three specific ways: as an obstacle to the approach, as an impediment to visibility, and as cover from fire. All other properties, he thought, can be traced back to these three. Rarely in Clausewitz, if ever, is ground a passive element in battle, but rather it actively imparts its characterishcs on the course of events. Among these characteristics, he
included "contours of the countryside" (such as hills and valleys), "natural phenomena" (forests, swamps, lakes), and "factors produced through agriculture" (such as ditches, hedges, fences, and the like). These characteristics have as their essential effect the necessary dispersal, or scattering, of force. Again, quoting from On War:
As each type of terrain approaches its extreme, it will tend to reduce a general's influence on events to the same degree to which it tends to emphasize the personal resources of the ranks, down to the private soldier.'F or Clausewitz, there is a triangular relationship between "the character of the ground," the individual (as opposed to the mass), and the ampliUide of force.
Wearing the hypothetical condition of geographical passivityon, say, a perfectly flat, frictionless planethe absence of terrain allows for the concentration of individuals into an idealized mass, from which force may be derived ( fig. 14) . But, in reality, as the terrain "approaches its extreme," the mass is necessarily diffused, and each individual must increase both effort and will in order to maintain proper force. To be decisive, force must be held constant and high; the strategist must manage the variable relations between the individual and the terrain to preserve forcefulness. 14 Figure 15a Features; or. The Character of the Ground The terrain-sensing guided missile exploits the potential of this classical diagram precisely through the cancellahon, or fixing, of its variables. Though quantifiable to some extent in Clausewitz's day (as a number of troops, cavalrV/ guns, etc.) force becomes, for the guided missile, pure calculation; a direct measure of tons of explosive delivered to a single point. Similarly, the "will and resourcefulness of the individual"previously the most uncertain, and wildly fluctuating variableis here determined through automation; its decisiveness reduced, quite literally, to either zero or one, on or off. Whereas previously force was considered a function of mass, it is now derived through the principle of precision.
And finally the "character of the ground" as either an obstacle to approach, or as an impediment to vision, is erased ( fig. 15 ). In fact, the battleground is stood directly on its head, which is to say that those elements that previously presented the greatest difficulty in the forceful execution of warfaremountains, lakes, and riversbecome for the terrain-based missile sites of reference, "features" to be sensed, and keys to a successful flight path. The great irony of the terrainsensing missile is that it employs geography as means of canceling the efiects of geography in warfare.
This essay is an abbreviated version of a lecture delivered at Harvard 
